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INTRODUCTION 
Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law is part of an important 
project in which Professors Naomi Cahn and June Carbone expose and explain 
the diverging ideologies underlying some of the country's thorniest contempo-
rary social issues-those involving families, young people, and sex.' In Deep 
Purple, Professors Cahn and Carbone focus on religion's influence on public 
debate and public policy. They implicitly embrace legal secularism2 and de-
nounce religiously grounded social policy and public discourse. They offer a 
persuasive critique of abstinence-only sexual education, which they view as an 
example of a misguided policy rooted in religious ideology. And they demon-
Associate Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. 
J.D., Harvard Law School, B.A., Yale College. My most sincere thanks to Naomi Cahn for par-
ticipating in the conference, to Naomi Cahn and June Carbone both for their thought-provoking 
contribution to this Symposium Issue, and to the members of the WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, for 
their excellent work in coordinating, editing, and shepherding the Issue to publication. 
l 10 W.VA. L. REv. 459 (2007) [hereinafter Deep Purple]; Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, 
Red Families v. Blue Families, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=l008544 (August 16, 2007) 
[hereinafter Red Families]. In their larger project, Professors Cahn and Carbone explore the rela-
tionship between religion, moral values, and law. They examine how the distinct ideological 
commitments of the "red states" (those that voted for George W. Bush in the presidential election 
of 2004) and the "blue states" (those states that voted for John Kerry in 2004) play out in the 
regulation of families, sex, and sexuality. /d. at 6-7. 
2 
"Legal secularism" is a term used by Noah Feldman to describe the belief that there ought to 
be strict separation between government and religion. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY Goo: 
AMERICA's CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM- AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT 182-85 (2005). 
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strate that policymakers' and citizens' continued commitment to abstinence-
only education--despite evidence of its ineffectiveness-reveals the shortcom-
ings of a religiously based approach.3 
Part I of this Essay briefly summarizes Cahn and Carbone's article and 
suggests that it raises, but doesn't fully resolve, two questions. Part ll discusses 
the first: is there any place for religiously grounded advocacy or decision-
making in public life? Cahn and Carbone answer no, but the question is a com-
plex one that has prompted much scholarly debate. Part ill addresses the sec-
ond: which way forward? Cahn and Carbone begin to sketch possible ap-
proaches; this Essay examines them and suggests another (admittedly prosaic) 
alternative-a more patient reliance on the workings of both federalism and the 
political process.4 
I. DEEP PURPLE-AND THE QUESTIONS IT RAISES 
Deep Purple begins by exploring the ideological rift that increasingly 
divides the country. It canvases interdisciplinary research that gives insight on 
how and why the worldviews of the religiously devout I traditionalists I political 
conservatives differ dramatically from those of the less devout I modernists I 
political liberals.5 This research sheds light on both cultural and biological un-
derpinnings of various individual orientations (e.g., conservative and liberal, 
devout and less observant) and provides a fuller understanding of these diver-
gent perspectives.6 It helps to explain why the arguments of one group are fre-
quently inaccessible or irrelevant to the other.7 Cahn and Carbone argue that 
religiously grounded advocacy, which tends to proceed in absolutist terms, is 
especially difficult to approach when all participants do not share the same 
See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text. 
4 Cahn and Carbone discuss the development of different systems of family Jaw and the po-
larization of family policy among the states in Red Families. They note that, "[i]f each system 
proceeded on its own terms, within political and legal units that shared a common cultural frame-
work, we would predict continued evolution, but not necessarily irreconcilable conflicts ... . "Red 
Families, supra note 1, at 60-61. Their article then considers the role of the judiciary in managing 
the "intrusion of polarized political discourse into core issues of family Jaw." /d. at 61. They do 
not, however, address the possibilities for legislatively driven law reform and thus do not seem to 
hold out much hope for such reform. 
Deep Purple, supra note I, at 465-72. 
6 /d. Recent research, for example, not only documents the relationship between regular 
church attendance and political affiliation, but also suggests that heritable genetic factors may 
make some individuals more likely to identify with conservative or liberal political attitudes. See, 
e.g., id. at 465-68; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life Surveys, Religion and the 2006 Elec-
tions, available at http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DoclD=l74 (last visited October 3, 2007) 
(chronicling church attendance and party affiliation in 2002, 2004, and 2006 elections); John R. 
Alford, Carolyn L. Funk, & John R. Hibbing, Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmit-
ted?, 99 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 153, 158-61 (2005) (concluding that genetics has a stronger influence 
on ideology than does environment). 
7 Deep Purple, supra note 1, at 469-71 . 
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background ideology. 8 They conclude that advancing religious justifications for 
policies renders public discourse unproductive at best. 
Cahn and Carbone describe different positions likely to be staked out by 
individuals of distinct orientations on various social policies (immigration, the 
death penalty, etc.).9 They note that varying orientations-especially devout 
and secular-tend to correspond with different political allegiances. For exam-
ple, evangelical Christians comprised fifty-one percent of voters in states that 
voted Republican in 2004, but only twenty-two percent of voters in states that 
voted Democratic. 10 
Cahn and Carbone choose teen sexual education as a specific policy 
through which to develop their analysis. They examine the research evaluating 
the relative effectiveness of abstinence-only education (which tends to .be fa-
vored by the deeply religious) versus comprehensive sexual education pro-
grams. This research is striking; a growing number of studies have shown com-
prehensive education to be effective at reducing teen pregnancy and sexually 
transmitted disease, whereas abstinence-only education generally is not.11 
Finally, Cahn and Carbone highlight the difficulty of finding middle 
ground on what is essentially an "either-or" issue (i.e., a sexual education pro-
gram will teach either abstinence-only, or abstinence-plus-more). 12 This, along 
with the challenges of productive public discourse between starkly different 
groups, highlights the intransigence associated with the issue. The unequal out-
comes of abstinence-only versus comprehensive sexual education and the corre-
sponding implications for the future of the nation's young people bring home its 
importance. 
In considering all of this, Deep Purple begins to wrestle with two diffi-
cult and controversial questions-one more theoretical, the other more prag-
matic. First, is there any place for religiously informed political decision-
making or religious discourse in public life? Professors Cahn and Carbone im-
plicitly endorse the view that religion is a matter of private conviction to be kept 
separate from politics and public policy. Others argue, however, that divorcing 
religion from public life may be neither feasible nor altogether desirable, and 
that some middle ground is more appropriate.13 
Second, given the seemingly dim prospects for productive discourse or 
political compromise on the issue of teen sexual education, which way forward 
8 
9 
10 
/d. at 465-67. 
/d. at 467-71. 
/d. at 472. The families of red and blue states also differ: families in red states tend to be 
more religious, to be poorer, to marry and bear children earlier, and to divorce at rates higher than 
those in blue states. /d. at 479-82. 
II See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
12 Deep Purple, supra note 1, at 493-94. 
13 See generally KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995). 
Others still argue that religion fully belongs, in all of its glory, in public discourse. See, e.g., 
Michael Walzer, Drawing the Line: Religion and Politics, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 619 (1999). 
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appears most promising? Professors Cahn and Carbone resist solutions that call 
for compromising on the issue, as it is one that has far-reaching consequences 
for the future of the nation's young people.14 But it is possible that what is 
called for is not compromise at all, but patience. Educating the citizenry about 
teen sexual education programs may lead to increased pressure on federal legis-
lators to change national policy. Similarly, states may experiment with different 
programs and policies, and-in time-uniformity of practice may naturally 
emerge as effective programs are copied and ineffective programs abandoned. 
Taking this approach risks more teen births and sexually transmitted diseases in 
the short term, but rushing to impose a more uniform (albeit "better") policy 
requiring comprehensive sex education risks political reactions whose conse-
quences might reverberate over the longer term. This Essay considers these 
questions in tum. 
II. RELIGION, DISCOURSE, AND POLICY 
Cahn and Carbone suggest that religious individuals whose faith domi-
nates their identity may be _so committed to their religious institutions that they 
are less able to form commitments to other institutions important to democratic 
participation.15 In other words, for the deeply devout, allegiance to religious 
institutions may overshadow allegiance to political institutions, and their reli-
gious identity supersedes (or perhaps entirely dictates) their political identity. 
Religious ideology, not independent judgment, governs their social beliefs and 
practices-and their voting decisions. 16 While they do not say so explicitly, 
Cahn and Carbone suggest that, because of this, too much religion is itself un-
democratic. 
Cahn and Carbone do not suggest that, for these reasons, the deeply re-
ligious ought not participate in public life. What they do seem to emphasize 
(and to regret) is that while religion may have the power to encourage responsi-
ble and compassionate life choices, it can also polarize, creating deep, seem-
ingly unbridgeable divides between adherents and non-adherents. 
Cahn and Carbone argue that religiously grounded argument in public 
discourse is not just polarizing, but unproductive.17 Religious adherents who 
advance religious bases for public policy "state a conclusion in terms of an ap-
peal to authority that brooks no discussion or dissent."18 In other words, relig-
iously based argument claims absolute moral authority and access to some basic 
truth denied to (or rejected by) non-believers (or those who believe in a different 
way). Religious arguments, moreover, may be inaccessible-indeed unintelli-
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Deep Purple, supra note 1, at 494. 498. 
/d. at 497. 
/d. 
/d. at 495. 
/d. 
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gible-to those who do not share the same or similar religious comprehensive 
world view. Instead of persuading (or even informing) listeners, then, this sort 
of speech instead risks alienating them and stopping all conversation. 19 It is this 
argument, related to but distinct from the first, to which I wiii tum. 
Whether religion belongs in public discourse has been a hotly-contested 
issue. Constitutional scholars and political theorists have weighed in, and many 
have rejected bright-line or too-facile conclusions. Furthermore, arguments that 
Cahn and Carbone criticize as detrimental to public discourse are deemed by 
others to be evidence of an inclusive and well-functioning liberal democracy. 
But Cahn and Carbone find broad support for their position among com-
mentators. Constitutional scholar Bill Marshall, for instance, has stated that 
"religion and religious conviction are purely private matters that have no role or 
place in the nation's political process."20 And John Rawls argued that all citi-
zens deserve to have policies explained to them in terms broadly understandable 
by the public at large: 
[O]ur exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable 
only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the 
essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to 
endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them 
as reasonable and rational ... [T]he ideal of citizenship [thus] 
imposes .. . the duty of civility-to be able to explain to one 
another on those fundamental questions how the principles and 
policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the po-
litical values of public reason. 21 
Rawls and other scholars have thus argued that citizens and lawmakers 
engaged in public discussion and deliberation should employ "public reason"-
reasons and modes of argument that are generally accessible to the public at 
large. These include "(a) the general features of all reason, such as rules of in-
ference and evidence, and (b) generally shared beliefs, common-sense reason-
ing, and the noncontroversial methods of science."22 
Public reasons therefore exclude advocacy premised on comprehensive 
religious doctrine or philosophical moral theory.23 Examples of nonpublic rea-
sons include arguments based on utilitarian principles (considering pleasure and 
pain to be the only values relevant to decision-making) or those premised on 
religious belief in a sacred text authoritatively interpreted by church leaders as 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 157. 
William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 844 (1993). 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 217 (1993). 
Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 LOY. L.A. L.R.Ev. 1459 (1996). 
/d. 
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the source of binding moral obligation.24 Professor Lawrence Solum notes that 
both the utilitarian and the theological premises are nonpublic reasons (despite 
the former being secular and the latter religious) "because neither can be ac-
cepted as a reasonable ground for action by the public at large, which is under-
stood as the body of citizens who are in full possession of the powers of human 
reason and who nevertheless believe in a variety of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines. "25 
Those who embrace the ideal of public reason urge its adoption as a 
ground rule for public advocacy and lawmaking, but they do not go so far as to 
suggest imposing legal restrictions on public debate (nor do Professors Cahn or 
Carbone).2 Instead, the theory of public reason is an ideal of democratic citi-
zenship grounded in political morality.27 It is primarily "a counsel of self-
restraint. "28 · 
The debate around teen sexual education convincingly illustrates the 
way in which advocacy premised on a religious comprehensive view can ham-
per public debate. Cahn and Carbone present those who currently advocate 
comprehensive sexual education as committed to that position because it is sup-
ported by social facts. But these advocates might embrace abstinence-only pro-
grams if new facts came to light-if, for example, empirical data showed that 
abstinence-only was effective.29 But because the empirical data shows that ab-
stinence-only does not work, their position is that we need to abandon it in favor 
of a comprehensive program. Such a program furthers the ultimate goal of re-
ducing teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease. 
But to those who favor abstinence-only education, the empirical data is 
irrelevant. Their justification for this position is grounded in a morality based 
on traditional Christian teachings: premarital abstinence is itself part of a moral 
life. To them, comprehensive sexual education is analogous to instructing one's 
children not to skateboard, but then providing them with a helmet so that they 
may more safely engage in the prohibited behavior. And they reject sending 
this type of inconsistent message to teens. They view the ultimate goal of the 
policy as reducing teen sex and ensuring the unity of sex, procreation, and mar-
riage.30 
Religious adherents' emphasis on moral justifications stymies those 
who tend to reach policy decisions by considering empirical or social facts. 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
!d. 
!d. 
RAwLS, supra note 21, at 215-16; Solum, supra note 22, at 1466. 
RAWLS, supra note 21, at 216; Solum, supra note 22, at 1466. 
Kent Greenawalt, Natural Law and Public Reasons, 47 VILL. L. REv. 531,534 (2002). 
Deep Purple, supra note l, at 484-85,491. 
3° Cahn and Carbone note that "absolutist approaches place an emphasis on consistency. If 
non-marital sex is wrong, then the ineffectiveness of the programs in delaying sexuality does not 
itself justify a shift to programs that appear to sanction non-marital sexuality by providing greater 
access to contraception." !d. at 486. 
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And neither is able to make headway in their attempts to persuade, nor are they 
able to locate common ground. Cahn and Carbone's example persuasively pin-
points the political impasses and fruitless dialogue that may result from relig-
iously grounded advocacy or justifications for policy. But does that necessarily 
mean that religion should be excised from public discourse? 
Some who advocate the ideal of public reason nonetheless limit its 
scope; others reject the ideal altogether. For instance, Professor Kent 
Greenawalt suggests that citizens acting in a non-public capacity may make 
judgments on whatever grounds they find persuasive and need not exercise self-
restraint in their advocacy.31 But the public role of legislators imposes upon 
them obligations different from those of private citizens, circumscribing their 
behavior-but only to a degree. Greenawalt allows that legislators, as the voice 
of their constituents, ought to be able to take into account their constituents' 
religiously grounded convictions when making political determinations.32 He 
also allows that it may be appropriate for legislators to give weight to their own 
comprehensive views.33 Because of their roles as public actors, however, legis-
lators ought to be able to give public reasons for their political positions (even 
those largely based on their own or their constituents' religious comprehensive 
views), for the reasons discussed earlier.34 Greenawalt acknowledges that this 
may result in some discrepancies between legislators' actual bases for judgment 
and the bases on which they advocate in public discourse.35 He reasons, how-
ever, that it is not necessary for public advocacy to reflect all bases of decision. 
And sometimes it is indeed proper for legislators to publicly acknowledge the 
religious or other comprehensive grounds that have influenced a determina-
tion.36 He concludes that "[o]n specific issues, it may be appropriate for legisla-
tors to declare that they are affected by underlying religious grounds, but they 
should make their arguments in other terms. "37 
Rawls also limits the scope of the ideal of public reason. He restricts 
his consideration of the situations in which public reason ought to apply to cases 
involving "constitutional essentials" or "questions of basic justice."38 He does 
not explicitly consider whether it ought to also apply to "lesser" policy ques-
tions. 
31 GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 160. 
32 /d. at 161. At the same time, Professor Greenawalt suggests that legislators should weigh 
more heavily constituent positions grounded in public reason given that it is preferable to base 
decisions on such reasons. /d. 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
/d. at 162. 
/d. at 162-64. 
/d. at 163-64. 
Id. at 158, 163. 
Id. at 158. 
RAWLS, supra note 21, at 214. 
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Other scholars, of course, resist altogether the ideal of public reason and 
the notion that it imposes duties of self-restraint. They argue that liberal democ-
racy should not seek to limit the means by which citizens reach judgments be-
tween competing policies, and freedom should include the right to advocate on 
religious grounds. Political philosopher Michael Walzer suggests that public 
reason is itself undemocratic, as "there is in fact no way of excluding absolutist 
convictions and passions without excluding the people who hold them. So it is 
better to welcome their expression and hope that the pressure of democratic 
argument will ensure that absolutism is not the last word."39 He argues that 
democratic politics can-and ought to-permit religious and ideological groups 
to mobilize whatever passion they can.40 The important distinction, he claims, 
is not between religious and secular advocacy, but instead between advocacy 
and state-sponsored coercion. What ought to be "separated is probably not best 
described as religion and politics. We [instead] separate religion from state 
power ... .'>'~ 1 While democratic ideals demand that advocacy-including relig-
iously based advocacy-be free and open to all, "coercion belongs only to the 
state and has to be denied to ecclesiastical authorities and charismatic religious 
leaders .... "42 
Irrespective of their positions on the ideal of public reason, there is 
broad consensus among scholars that religious ideology ought not be the sole 
justification for any policy. Walzer draws a line between religious advocacy or 
influence and religious coercion. He relies on constitutional limits to prevent, 
for example, powerful religious groups from publicly imposing religious cate-
chism.43 Along similar lines, Greenawalt argues that even if a religious com-
prehensive view is the predominant reason for legislation in a legislator's own 
mind, it is important that the same position also be supportable by public rea-
son.44 
Allowing that religious advocacy will continue to exist in the public 
square and that religious views will continue to influence policy, we are left to 
consider the constitutional safeguard against excessive government entangle-
ment in religion. Establishment Clause jurisprudence is murky, and identifying 
its precise contours is well beyond the scope of this Essay. Yet it requires, if not 
an impregnable wall between church and state,45 at least that government 
"minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious be-
39 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Walzer, supra note 13, at 637. 
/d. 
/d. at 635. 
/d. 
/d. 
GREENAWALT, supra note 13, at 161-64. 
45 Modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence began with the Supreme Court's ruling in 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947). In Everson, the Court articulated a separation-
ist paradigm for Establishment Clause jurisprudence: "(T]he First Amendment has erected a wall 
between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable." /d. at 18. 
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lief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.'.46 Even 
for those who favor an approach that is more accommodating of religion's role 
in society, "the Establishment Clause ... at a minimum ... guarantees that gov-
ernment may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exer-
cise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious 
faith, or tends to do so. "'47 
If anything is clear, it is that religion alone, or the desire to advance re-
ligion or religious ideology, cannot justify social policy. Yet, as will be dis-
cussed in Part III, Cahn and Carbone make a strong argument that abstinence-
only education does nothing more than give effect to religiously derived ideol-
ogy. Nonetheless, it is rare that those who advocate a certain policy (even one 
stemming primarily from religious conviction) will be unable to demonstrate 
some non-religious or non-moral justifications for it.48 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court found that abstinence-only education furthered secular purposes and up-
held the Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA"), which includes funding for 
programs aimed at preventing teen sexual activity.49 Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority in the five-to-four decision, found that the law "was 
motivated primarily, if not entirely, by a legitimate secular purpose-the elimi-
nation or reduction of social and economic problems caused by teenage sexual-
ity, pregnancy and parenthood."50 (The Court's conclusion becomes more ques-
tionable when viewed in light of the empirical data that has since emerged.)51 
46 Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive arul Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 
DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1001 (1990). 
47 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 
(1984)). Constitutional scholar Steven Gey warns, however, that with recent changes in the Su-
preme Court (i.e., the confirmations of Justices Roberts and Alito), 
[w]e may be on the cusp of a root-and-branch change in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, which will fundamentally alter the landscape of church/state re-
lations and produce a constitutional regime that specifically permits the gov-
ernment to endorse the views of the religious majority and use government 
programs to advance the majority's sectarian goals. 
Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FrRST AMEND. L. REv. 1, I (2006). 
48 A state statute criminalizing adult, consensual, private, same-sex sodomy was a recent and 
relatively unusual exception. The Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 
found that only moral justifications could explain the prohibition, rendering it impermissible un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment. 
49 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). AFLA explicitly permits states to award grants to 
both religious and nonreligious organizations. Adolescent Family Life Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
300z(a)(l)-300z(a)(l0) (2000). The Court held that the Jaw treated religious and secular groups 
equally, and noted that the First Amendment allows religious institutions to participate in publicly 
sponsored social programs. /d. at 609. Welfare reform legislation passed by Congress in 1996 
also provides funding to programs containing abstinence-only messages aimed at recipients of 
public assistance. See generally, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 912, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); 42 U.S.C. § 7JO(b)(2) (1998). 
50 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 602. Justice Blackmun wrote a strongly worded dissent, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. He concluded that the Act subsidized religious teaching 
and advanced religion, arguing that "[g]ovemment funds are paying for religious organizations to 
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But Cahn and Carbone argue that constitutional considerations consti-
tute only one aspect of the issue, and not the most important. They suggest that 
the larger issue is the intertwining of cultural and religious views that, while not 
shared by a majority of Americans, are nonetheless embodied in policy.52 Their 
argument thus raises a second question. Assuming that we are operating within 
the realm of the constitutionally permissible but that current policy is nonethe-
less objectionable, what practical strategies are most likely to work? The next 
Part examines Cahn and Carbone's approach to this question and suggests an-
other possible approach. 
III. ABSTINENCE-ONLY VS. COMPREHENSIVE SEX EDUCATION: WHICH WAY 
FORWARD? 
A growing body of research strongly suggests that comprehensive sex-
ual education is more effective than abstinence-only education at preventing 
teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease. Comprehensive sexual educa-
tion programs (which can include teaching the benefits of abstinence) are more 
effective at reducing teen pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, and no 
less effective than abstinence-only programs at discouraging early sexual activ-
ity.s3 
Yet abstinence-only education comports with many religions' (espe-
cially fundamentalist denominations') general condemnation of nonmarital 
sex,
54 
and Cahn and Carbone note that those who are deeply religious are more 
likely to support abstinence-only sexual education than those who are not. Re-
cent studies, however, demonstrate that abstinence-only education is not only 
less effective than comprehensive sexual education, but altogether ineffective.55 
A 2007 Congressionally-authorized study and recent studies by the American 
Psychological Association and the Center for Disease Control all concluded that 
abstinence-only programs have limited or no effect on the rate of teen sexual 
teach and counsel impressionable adolescents on a highly sensitive subject of considerable reli-
gious significance." /d. at 635 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
51 
52 
53 
See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
Deep Purple, supra note 1, at 491. 
/d. at 485-86. 
54 /d. at 477. Cahn and Carbone note that most religions embrace the unity of sex, procreation, 
and marriage. 
55 /d. at 484-85. The authors discuss various studies, including an April 2007 review of feder-
ally funded abstinence programs authorized by Congress, a 2005 report issued by the American 
Psychological Association, and a 2002 study conducted by the Center for Disease Control. These 
studies found abstinence-only programs to have limited or no effectiveness at reducing teen sexual 
activity. See id. at 484-86 Moreover, abstinence-only education appears to be correlated to re-
duced use of birth control and increased risk of sexually transmitted diseases. /d. 
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activity.56 Instead, abstinence-only programs correlate with lower rates of teen 
contraceptive use and increased risk of sexually transmitted diseases. 57 
The case against abstinence-only education is a convincing one. Given 
its ineffectiveness, it becomes difficult to imagine non-religious reasons for its 
continued support. Indeed, this had led some commentators to find more sup-
port for the argument that publicly funded abstinence-only education programs 
serve only to advance a religious viewpoint and, thus, violate the First Amend-
ment's Establishment Clause.58 But for our purposes, we assume no forthcom-
ing change in constitutional doctrine. And Cahn and Carbone do not make a 
constitutional argument; instead, they argue that abstinence-only education 
represents nothing more than a religious viewpoint, does nothing to improve the 
lives of adolescents, and is contrary to the preferences of an overwhelming ma-
jority of Americans. 
Yet given that those who do support abstinence-only programs appear 
unlikely to waver in their support anytime soon, what might be done? Cahn and 
Carbone reject any solution involving compromising on the substantive issue: 
"Compromise, which might involve teaching ... only the abstinence education 
component [of sex education, is] concession."59 
They imagine, instead, that we might seek "potential points of conver-
gence." They suggest the possibility of "using the language of faith to support 
the need for comprehensive sex education," or "comprehensive sex education 
advocated by faith cornmunities."60 In short, they consider adapting rhetoric in 
order to make comprehensive sex education more acceptable to those who cur-
rently oppose it. Thus, they surmise that "[c]ompromising on language-using 
the language of faith-to advocate [comprehensive sexual education] policies 
may provide leverage ... [But c]ompromising on the law-allowing abstinence 
only education because it is at least a form of sex education- serves no one."61 
They perceive no real room for compromise. And there are, of course, genuine 
questions about whether reframing the debate can result in widespread conver-
gence or induce abstinence-only adherents to cross over to the comprehensive 
sexual education side. (It is also noteworthy that Cahn and Carbone envision 
introducing religion back into the discussion, albeit in a different way; this sug-
gests that there may indeed be some value to a dialogue that goes beyond public 
reason, at least in a context where one side is already communicating in this 
fashion.) 
S6 !d. at 485. 
57 !d. at 485-86. 
58 See, e.g., James McGrath, Abstinence-Only Adolescent Education: Ineffective, Unpopular, 
and Unconstitutional, 38 U.S.F. L. REv. 665 (2004); Julie Jones, Money, Sex, and the Religious 
Right: A Constitutional Analysis of Federally Funded Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage Sexuality 
Education, 35 CREIG!ITON L. REv. 1075 (2002). 
59 
60 
61 
Deep Purple, supra note I, at 494. 
!d. at492. 
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Given the binary nature of this issue (abstinence vs. more-than-just-
abstinence), the strongly held views on either side, and the resulting impasse, it 
may be necessary to ask whether, from a policymaking perspective, there is any 
way to bridge the gap. But is national consensus really necessary? The central 
importance of this issue to the future of young people makes many impatient for 
reversal of what appears to be improvident policy. And from that perspective, it 
is hard to accept that change sometimes happens much more slowly than we 
would like. 
But slow doesn't mean static. The most promising option may simply 
be one to which Cahn and Carbone refer but do not develop:62 defer to the work-
ings of the political process generally and our system of federalism in particular. 
Federal legislation currently supports abstinence education.63 Even if 
the majority of citizens favoring comprehensive sexual education are not suffi-
ciently mobilized to have that legislation changed or invalidated today, they 
should receive information that (1) public monies are going to supporting absti-
nence-only education on a national scale; and (2) abstinence-only education is 
ineffective. If the political process works as it should, they will then pressure 
their representatives to withdraw support for the legislation, and failing that, 
they may vote those representatives out of office (or at least note strikes against 
them). 
What Professors Cahn and Carbone chronicle might be, in one sense, a 
perfect example of horizontal federalism in action. Different states are engaged 
in different social experiments. Those experiments certainly may not unduly 
interfere with individual constitutional rights, but short of that, this very sort of 
state-by-state experimentation is at the core of our national system. It has fre-
quently been noted that the states "serve as laboratories for the development of 
new social, economic, and political ideas."64 
In the area of divorce, for example, fault-based regimes led to wide-
spread collusion and perjury.65 California was the first state to implement a pure 
no-fault divorce regime, and eventually every state added no-fault or similar 
grounds to existing statutes or replaced their divorce regimes with a pure no-
fault regime. 66 And a few decades from now, Massachusetts may be to gay mar-
riage what California has been to no-fault divorce.67 
62 See supra note 4. 
63 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
64 Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 787-88 (1982) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
( 1932) (Brandeis, J ., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). See also ERWIN CHEMERJNSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 315 (3d ed. 2006). 
65 See Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 
86 VA. L. REv. 1497, 1507 (2000). 
66 See Herrna Hili Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its 
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 4-6 ( 1987). A number of states had provisions in their statutes 
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Today, some states may enact systems of social regulation that tend to 
reflect the religiously derived values of their citizens. Others may enact systems 
of social regulation that tend to reflect different values. Open exchanges of in-
formation might eventually illustrate convincingly to the citizens of a given state 
which of the existing policies enjoy success. Eventually, perhaps more states 
will adopt the policy that better reflects the values of their citizenry; we can 
hope that it will also be one that works. 
CONCLUSION 
Given that the empirical evidence demonstrates that abstinence-only 
education does not work, Deep Purple persuasively criticizes the continued 
commitment to it as driven by ideology rather than the goal of protecting young 
people.68 Professors Cahn and Carbone have eloquently laid out the policy di-
lemma facing the nation. But while the high stakes involved emerge clearly, the 
way forward is less clear. 
The dialogue between entrenched groups that they propose may be dif-
ficult, and any progress is likely to be slow. And there is no doubt that allowing 
federalism to run its course poses some risk: legal secularists might view the 
risk as the nation's young people getting married and having babies too young 
(not reaching their own full potential, educational and otherwise), and religious 
conservatives might view the risk as those same young people having too much 
meaningless sex and living morally bankrupt lives. 
Yet it is indeed possible that a combined approach-new approaches to 
dialogue (perhaps a dialogue that Cahn and Carbone envision could accommo-
date both public reasons and religious elements) as well as both federal and 
state-based advocacy-may ultimately result in national consensus that will in 
the end reflect the right course for American society. It may take time, but there 
appears to be no other realistic course of action. 
that predated the California Act and that permitted divorce based on separation or incompatibility 
grounds. /d. at 6 n.22. 
67 Massachusetts is the first (and so far only) state to allow same-sex couples to marry. See 
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding the exclusion of same-
sex couples from marriage to be "incompatible with the [Massachusetts] constitutional principles 
of respect for individual autonomy and equality under law."); see also Largess v. Supreme Judi-
cial Court for the State of Mass., 373 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 2004) (refusing to enjoin the implementa-
tion of Goodridge). 
68 Deep Purple, supra note I, at 486. 
